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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2247
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we analyze tax competition in a model where investor firms have the choice between two types of investment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. We show that the coexistence of these two types of investment intensifies tax competition in comparison to the case where there is only greenfield investment. If a specific tax on acquisitions is available, this result changes. Then, tax competition is mitigated compared to the pure greenfield case. The existence of an acquisition tax may even lead to corporate overtaxation.
Schlagwörter: 
corporate taxation
mergers and acquisitions
tax competition
JEL: 
H25
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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