Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261238 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2021-09
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
Experimental research has shown that ordinary people often perform remarkably well in solving coordination games that involve no conflicts of interest. While most experiments in the past studied such coordination games among socially distant anonymous players, here we study behaviour in a set of two player coordination games and compare the outcomes depending on whether the players are socially close or socially distant. We find that social closeness influences prospects for coordination, but whether it helps, harms or has no impact on coordination probabilities, depends on the structure of the game.
Subjects: 
Coordination
Lab-in-the-field experiment
Oneness
Salience
Social closeness
Social distance
JEL: 
C72
C92
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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