Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261100 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 18-06
Version Description: 
Vers. 02/2019
Publisher: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Abstract: 
Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.
Subjects: 
CEO Duality
Board of Directors
Corporate Governance
Regulation S-K
Textual Analysis
JEL: 
G14
G34
G38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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