Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261100 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFR Working Paper No. 18-06
Versionsangabe: 
Vers. 02/2019
Verlag: 
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous and comprise more words, including more positive words, for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering the firm's characteristics.
Schlagwörter: 
CEO Duality
Board of Directors
Corporate Governance
Regulation S-K
Textual Analysis
JEL: 
G14
G34
G38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
825.73 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.