Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26090
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten_US
dc.contributor.authorde Haan, Jakoben_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:49Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26090-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2045en_US
dc.subject.jelE5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen_US
dc.subject.stwInflationen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleDoes high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job?: evidence based on a new data seten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn538341599en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
207.12 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.