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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten
dc.contributor.authorde Haan, Jakoben
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-27-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:49Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:49Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26090-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2045en
dc.subject.jelE5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen
dc.subject.stwInflationen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleDoes high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job?: evidence based on a new data set-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538341599en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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