Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26040
Authors: 
Roux, Catherine
von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper 1995
Abstract: 
We examine the effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, influencing firms' whistle blowing incentives in one market, on their self-reporting decision in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in another market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC policy. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.
JEL: 
K21
K42
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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