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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 153-184
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies static rational inattention problems with multiple actions and multiple shocks. We solve for the optimal signals chosen by agents and provide tools to interpret information processing. By relaxing restrictive assumptions previously used to gain tractability, we allow agents more latitude to choose what to pay attention to. Our applications examine the pricing problem of a monopolist who sells in multiple markets and the portfolio problem of an investor who can invest in multiple assets. The more general models that our methods allow us to solve yield new results. We show conditions under which the multimarket monopolist would optimally choose a uniform pricing strategy, and we show how optimal information processing by rationally inattentive investors can be interpreted as learning about the Sharpe ratio of a diversified portfolio.
Schlagwörter: 
Rational inattention
information acquisition
price discrimination
portfolio choice
JEL: 
D81
D83
G11
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