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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 943-978
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit-free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tâtonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates.
Schlagwörter: 
Deficit free
dominant strategy mechanisms
double clock auctions
individual rationality
multidimensional types
privacy preservation
reserve prices
VCG mechanism
JEL: 
C72
D44
D47
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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