Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/252044 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9527
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers real resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.
Subjects: 
profit shifting
international taxation
global minimum tax
tax avoidance multinational firms
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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