Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/251437 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 404
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
We address some open issues regarding the characterization of double auctions. Our model is a two-sided commodity market with either finitely or infinitely many traders. We first unify existing formulations for both finite and infinite markets and generalize the characterization of market clearing in the presence of ties. Second, we define a mechanism that achieves market clearing in any, finite or infinite, market instance and show that it coincides with the k-double auction by Rustichini et al. (1994) in the former case. In particular, it clarifies the consequences of ties in submissions and makes common regularity assumptions obsolete. Finally, we show that the resulting generalized mechanism implements Walrasian competitive equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Double auction
Walrasian equilibrium
finite and infinite markets
axiomatization
JEL: 
D44
D47
D50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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