Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248611 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1152
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we experimentally compare three implementations of Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different implementations result in similar outcomes in all our domains of investigation, namely: coalition formation, alignment with the Shapley value prediction and axioms satisfaction. Our results suggest that a lighter bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as appropriate cooperative solution concept, while saving unnecessary costs in terms of time and resources.
Schlagwörter: 
Nash Program
Shapley value
Experiments
Winter mechanism
JEL: 
C71
C72
C90
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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