Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248594 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1134
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.
Schlagwörter: 
Multi-object allocation problem
Strategy-proofness
Efficiency
Minimumprice Walrasian rule
Non-quasi-linear preference
Heterogeneous objects
JEL: 
D82
D47
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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