Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248594 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1134
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.
Subjects: 
Multi-object allocation problem
Strategy-proofness
Efficiency
Minimumprice Walrasian rule
Non-quasi-linear preference
Heterogeneous objects
JEL: 
D82
D47
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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