Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/246692 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 2107
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
We study properties of collective action problems bounded by minimal contributions as well as endowment and variable contributions are neighbourhood dependent. We relate nearness to non-interior agents and its implication for interior contribution. Here, we see the aspects of node distance to non-interior agents which have implications for interior agents. Endowments may be redistributed among agents. We highlight strict conditions for budget-balanced transfers for which neighbourhood contributions and individual residual consumption are invariant. Agents may or may not be concerned about neighbourhood outcomes. We find that welfare is self-correcting and neither cases are relevant to the overall welfare impact of neutral transfers.
Schlagwörter: 
Centrality
Contagion
Neutrality
Peer Effect
JEL: 
C72
D85
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
432.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.