Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245512 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9331
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
A monopolist producing vertically differentiated durable goods can offer in each period a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We show that, contrary to the Coase conjecture for the homogeneous durable good monopoly, thanks to the ability to produce differentiated durable goods, in all Markov-Perfect Equilibria, the profit of a monopolist that cannot commit to future price-quality menus is bounded below by a strictly positive value independent of the discount factor.
Subjects: 
product quality
durable good monopoly
second-degree price discrimination
Coase conjecture
JEL: 
C73
D42
L12
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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