Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24310 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 99-25
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper demonstrates that insiders can erect barriers to entry and skim rents by sinking costs in human capital when labour markets are otherwise perfectly contestable. The sunk costs nature of human capital investments may result from the need to satisfy ever increasing specialised skill requirements in our society. When outsiders can not threat with market entry, insiders invest inefficiently in human capital such that their rent share is maximized. This inefficiency results from the hold-up problem that arises since workers are not residual claimants of the human capital rents. On the other hand, since insiders´ investments are negatively correlated with the number of workers, this may lead to higher than efficient investments nevertheless. When outsiders have an effective entry threat, insiders are forced to accept higher employment of outsiders and share the reduced rents with them. However, full employment is not necessarily reached and in any case investments are higher and social rent is lower than optimal.
Schlagwörter: 
Insider-Outsider
Human Capital
Rents
Unemployment
Hold-Up
JEL: 
J41
J24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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