Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24271 
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 98-19
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We suggest a model of electoral competition between two parties which is extended by a third player : mass media. The classical one-dimensional competition model is changed by introducing an issue-specific sensibility-coefficient and by allowing for non-voting. The winner is selected by majority rule. The voter potentials of the parties are determined by their current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) traditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of potential voters. The number of non-voters increases with the sensibility of individuals to the issue and with the deviation distance. By reporting with political bias, mass media has selective influence on the sensibility-coefficient of potential voters of both parties. They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which alters the number of non-voters. Parties being able to successfully communicate with mass media can manage to turn an unfavourable situation before election campaigning into an electoral victory.
Subjects: 
Public choice
electoral competition
mass media
reputation
credibility
JEL: 
D82
D72
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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