Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24081
Authors: 
Czarnitzki, Dirk
Kraft, Kornelius
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 04-75
Abstract: 
The present paper first discusses theoretically the different incentives of manager- versus owner-controlled firms for investment into innovative activity. In addition, the role of debt financing is analyzed. Subsequently the results from an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications are presented. A sample of German firms covering 2,793 observations is used, and it turns out that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers are.
Subjects: 
Innovation
Patents
Corporate Governance
Limited Dependent Variables
JEL: 
O31
L11
O32
C25
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
289.2 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.