Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240415 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WWZ Working Paper No. 2020/06
Verlag: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics due to exogenous newsworthy events. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.
Schlagwörter: 
Attention
campaign finance
interest groups
legislative voting
mass media
roll call voting
US House of Representatives
JEL: 
D72
L82
L86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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