Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237995 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 204
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen und Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
With (automatic) exchange of tax information among countries now common, tax evaders have had to find new ways to hide their offshore holdings. One such way are citizenship-by-investment programs, which offer foreigners a new passport for a local investment or a fixed fee. We show analytically that high-income individuals acquire a new citizenship to lower the probability that their tax evasion is detected through information exchange. Using data on cross-border bank deposits, we find that deposits in tax havens increase after a country starts offering a citizenship-by-investment program, providing indirect evidence that tax evaders use these programs.
Schlagwörter: 
Citizenship-by-investment programs
tax havens
tax evasion
JEL: 
H26
H24
F53
K37
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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