Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/236655 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9113
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
A lack of platform-level competition among digital marketplaces can result in socially inefficient platform design and meaningful welfare losses, even independent of actively anticompetitive behavior. To illustrate the first-order effects platform design can have on competitive outcomes, I investigate how the longstanding design of the product ratings system on Apple’s App Store affected innovative behavior by platform participants. I leverage an exogenous change in this system to show that for nearly a decade, the design of the App Store’s product ratings system led to less frequent product updating by high-quality products. I provide suggestive evidence that this policy resulted in lost, as opposed to simply delayed, innovation.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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