Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232452 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8855
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Charitable fundraisers frequently announce giving by others, and research shows that this can increase donations. However, this mechanism may not put information about peers to the most efficient use if it is costly to inform individuals who are indifferent to peer actions or causes some individuals to give less. We investigate whether a simple mechanism without incentives can predict heterogeneity in charitable responses to peer decisions. We elicit beliefs about donations in a baseline solicitation, and in subsequent solicitations we randomly assign information about others’ donations. We find that elicited beliefs are often logically inconsistent and that many subjects fail to update beliefs when treated. However, elicited beliefs can predict heterogeneous treatment effects if individuals are engaged and the information is salient.
Subjects: 
charitable
donation
norm
social preferences
peer effects
experiment
JEL: 
D01
D64
A13
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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