Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/231786 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economics [ISSN:] 0047-2727 [Volume:] 168 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 174-192
Verlag: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of “taxpayers” vote for the public transfer.
Schlagwörter: 
Stigma
Signaling
Redistribution
Non-take-up
Welfare program
JEL: 
C91
D03
H31
I38
DOI der veröffentlichten Version: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Datei(en):
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