Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/231786
Authors: 
Friedrichsen, Jana
König, Tobias
Schmacker, Renke
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economics [ISSN:] 0047-2727 [Year:] 2018 [Volume:] 168 [Pages:] 174-192
Abstract: 
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live off others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of “taxpayers” vote for the public transfer.
Subjects: 
Stigma
Signaling
Redistribution
Non-take-up
Welfare program
JEL: 
C91
D03
H31
I38
Published Version’s DOI: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

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