Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230141 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Scottish Journal of Political Economy [ISSN:] 1467-9485 [Volume:] 67 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 455-461
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
One of the key institutional elements for reducing inequality is the tax and transfer system. However, economists and policymakers usually view high taxes as detrimental to economic growth. We isolate one important mechanism by which higher taxes reduce inequality and raise per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at the same time. This mechanism operates in the presence of unproductive lobbying. Higher taxes induce a reallocation from lobbying toward production. This raises overall output and reduces the consumption gap between those who benefit from lobbying and those who bear its negative effects.
Schlagwörter: 
equity‐efficiency trade‐off
inequality
lobbying
rent‐seeking
taxation
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