Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228853 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 050
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
I propose a theory of debt maturity as an incentive device to motivate innovation when contracts are fundamentally incomplete and shaped by ex-post renegotiation. The financing of innovative firms must balance two goals. On the one hand, since innovation is inherently risky, the entrepreneur must receive adequate protection after failure. Simultaneously, the firm must be liquidated when its assets can be redeployed more efficiently elsewhere. Meeting these two goals can be especially challenging when contracts are incomplete. I show how an appropriate choice of debt maturity, together with ex-post contract renegotiation, embeds a "put option" into the firm's capital structure. The put is exercised when liquidation is efficient, and it partially insures the entrepreneur against failure and thus motivates innovation. The theory has novel empirical implications for the financing patterns of innovative firms.
Schlagwörter: 
Innovation
Debt maturity
Incomplete contracts
Renegotiation
JEL: 
C78
D82
D86
G32
G33
O31
O32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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