Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228430
Authors: 
Carranza, Eliana
Garlick, Robert
Orkin, Kate
Rankin, Neil
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 20-328
Abstract: 
We present field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform design of information-provision mechanisms.
Subjects: 
Job search
hiring
two-sided limited information
worker assessment
field experiment
employment
earnings
JEL: 
J23
J24
J31
J41
O15
O17
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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