Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228378
Authors: 
Fallucchi, Francesco
Nosenzo, Daniele
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2020-14
Abstract: 
A popular empirical technique to measure norms uses coordination games to elicit what subjects in an experiment consider appropriate behavior in a given situation (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The Krupka-Weber method works under the assumption that subjects use their normative expectations to solve the coordination game. However, subjects might use alternative focal points to coordinate, in which case the method may deliver distorted measurements of the social norm. We test the vulnerability of the Krupka-Weber method to the presence of alternative salient focal points. We find that the method is robust as long as there are clear normative expectations about what constitutes appropriate behavior. In settings where there is a less clear consensus about the social norm, the method is more vulnera
Subjects: 
Social Norms
Krupka-Weber method
Coordination
Focal Point
Saliency
Dictator Game
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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