Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227216 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13689
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper investigates experimentally how the inclination to cheat changes when agents report the result of multiple realizations of a (private information) stochastic event rather than a single outcome. Extreme outcomes clearly signal opportunistic behavior with multiple realizations. The consequent reputation concerns dramatically reduce cheating by large amounts. Multiple draws, however, erode the intrinsic cost of lying, inducing a widespread inclination to slightly misreport the outcomes in a plausible manner. These two opposite effects are similar in magnitude, on average, but show an interesting gender differentiation implying that multiple realizations can be effective with males but may backfire with females.
Subjects: 
cheating
reputation concerns
moral self-licensing
JEL: 
C81
C91
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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