Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/225056
Authors: 
Abrardi, Laura
Colombo, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 84
Abstract: 
We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore, we find that a lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia.
Subjects: 
Insurance markets
Asymmetric information
Risk assessment
Market concentration
JEL: 
D43
D82
G22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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