Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/225056 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 84
Verlag: 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore, we find that a lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia.
Schlagwörter: 
Insurance markets
Asymmetric information
Risk assessment
Market concentration
JEL: 
D43
D82
G22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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