Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/223469 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8397
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We propose a theoretical model that embeds social identity concerns, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), with inequity averse preferences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We conduct an artefactual ultimatum game experiment with registered members of British political parties, for whom political identity is salient and redistribution is also likely to be salient. The empirical results are as follows. (1) Proposers and responders demonstrate ingroup-favoritism. (2) Proposers exhibit quantitatively stronger social identity effects relative to responders. (3) As redistributive taxes increase, average offers by proposers and the average minimum acceptable offers of responders (both as a proportion of income) decline by almost the same amount, suggesting a shared understanding that is characteristic of social norms. (4) Subjects experience less disadvantageous inequity from ingroup members relative to outgroup members.
Subjects: 
social identity
political identity
prosocial behavior
ultimatum game
fiscal redistribution
entitlements
JEL: 
D01
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.