Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223444
Authors: 
Gassebner, Martin
Schaudt, Paul
Wong, Melvin H. L.
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8372
Abstract: 
This paper studies how an increase in the number of armed groups operating within an area affects the amount of organized political violence. We use plausible exogenous variation in the number of armed groups in Pakistan, by exploiting the split of a major group due to the natural death of its leader. Employing difference-in-difference and instrumental variable regressions on geocoded incident and fatality data allows us to derive a causal effect: more groups lead to more political violence. By combining different data sources and implementing a new approach to deal with potential double-counting, we provide a proxy for counter-insurgency efforts by the government. We show that the increase in violence is primarily driven by the armed groups and not by responses of the government.
Subjects: 
political violence
conflict
terrorism
armed groups
double-counting
JEL: 
D74
F52
H56
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.