Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222772
Authors: 
Hossain, Monzur
Yoshino, Naoyuki
Taghizadeh-Hesary, Farhad
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
ADBI Working Paper Series 1005
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a unique case of default risks and associated factors of a solar home system (SHS) program in Bangladesh and, within that context, proposes a theoretical market-based solution to finance a renewable energy (RE) program. The paper first develops a theoretical framework that highlights the problem of moral hazard in a subsidized government-sponsored program and then empirically assesses the default risks under the program. Using a primary survey data of 1,300 households, and applying probit and cox's proportional hazard model, we find that financial constraints, higher prices, natural disasters, and poor after-sales service are the factors that increase the probability of default, but in a different magnitude depending on the nature of customers. The factors that increase the probability of default for the group who are not willing to pay back (about 35% of total defaulters) are linked to adverse selection, perhaps due to moral hazard problems. The proposed market-based solution predicts that if the government uses a spillover revenue-based financing approach, it will increase the rate of return for private investors as well as the efficiency of RE programs.
Subjects: 
Bangladesh
default risks
renewable energy
market-based solutions
solar homes
spillover tax revenue
JEL: 
Q41
Q42
Q43
Q47
Q48
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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