Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222772 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ADBI Working Paper Series No. 1005
Verlag: 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes a unique case of default risks and associated factors of a solar home system (SHS) program in Bangladesh and, within that context, proposes a theoretical market-based solution to finance a renewable energy (RE) program. The paper first develops a theoretical framework that highlights the problem of moral hazard in a subsidized government-sponsored program and then empirically assesses the default risks under the program. Using a primary survey data of 1,300 households, and applying probit and cox's proportional hazard model, we find that financial constraints, higher prices, natural disasters, and poor after-sales service are the factors that increase the probability of default, but in a different magnitude depending on the nature of customers. The factors that increase the probability of default for the group who are not willing to pay back (about 35% of total defaulters) are linked to adverse selection, perhaps due to moral hazard problems. The proposed market-based solution predicts that if the government uses a spillover revenue-based financing approach, it will increase the rate of return for private investors as well as the efficiency of RE programs.
Schlagwörter: 
Bangladesh
default risks
renewable energy
market-based solutions
solar homes
spillover tax revenue
JEL: 
Q41
Q42
Q43
Q47
Q48
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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