Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222062 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2019/15
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
Potent immunosuppressant drugs suppress the body's ability to reject a transplanted organ up to the point that a transplant across blood- or tissue-type incompatibility becomes possible. In contrast to the standard kidney exchange problem, our setting also involves the decision about which patients receive from the limited supply of immunosuppressants that make them compatible with originally incompatible kidneys. We firstly present a general computational framework to model this problem. Our main contribution is a range of efficient algorithms that provide flexibility in terms of meeting meaningful objectives. We also show that these algorithms satisfy desirable axiomatic and strategic properties.
Subjects: 
kidney exchange
immunosuppressant drugs
matching
complexity
JEL: 
C63
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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