Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221476 
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1120
Publisher: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Abstract: 
We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a 2-bidder asymmetric first price auction with affiliated values. The techniques used to prove uniqueness are different from the ones used in analyses of private values environments. Moreover the proof of existence is constructive. For comparison purposes we also consider the war of attrition and show that there is a continuum of equilibria in that game.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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