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Merlin, Vincent R.
Saari, Donald G.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1112
An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n>3 or n=3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By use of a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying which profiles are susceptible to these difficulties. For instance, we show that for n=3 candidates that the CM reduces the negative aspects of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
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Working Paper

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