Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221420
Autoren: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Datum: 
1993
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1063
Zusammenfassung: 
Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith(1973) and Young(1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
540.01 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.