Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221420
Authors: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Year of Publication: 
1993
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1063
Abstract: 
Earlier derivations of scoring rules, by Smith(1973) and Young(1975), assumed that a voter can express only a rank ordering of the alternatives on his or her ballot. This paper shows that scoring rules can be derived without this ordering assumption. It is shown that a voting rule must be a scoring rule if it satisfies three basic axioms: reinforcement, overwhelming majorities, and neutrality. Other range and nonreversal axioms are also discussed.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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