Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221378 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1993
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1021
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the allocation of goods in exchange economies with a finite number of agents who may have private information about their preferences. In such a setting, standard allocation rules such as Walrasian equilibria or rational expectations equilibria are not compatible with individual incentives. We characterize the set of allocations rules which are incentive compatible, or in other words, the set of strategy-proof social choice functions. The social choice functions which are strategy-proof are those which can be obtained from trading according to pre-specified proportions. The number of proportions which can be accommodated is proportional to the number of agents. Such rules are necessarily inefficient, even in the limit as the economy grows.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
401.33 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.