Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221301
Authors: 
Spiegel, Yossef
Spulber, Daniel F.
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 942
Abstract: 
The equilibrium price, investment, and capital structure of a regulated firm are examined using a sequential model of regulation. The firm's capital structure is shown to have a significant effect on regulated prices, so that the firm's choice of debt and equity levels refelect regulatory responses. Moreover, debt financing weakens the incentive for regulators to "hold up" the firm so that leveraged firms can invest more than all-equity firms.
Subjects: 
capital structure
regulation
investment
public utilities
bankruptcy
JEL: 
L51
G32
G38
L9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.