Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221301 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1991
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 942
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
The equilibrium price, investment, and capital structure of a regulated firm are examined using a sequential model of regulation. The firm's capital structure is shown to have a significant effect on regulated prices, so that the firm's choice of debt and equity levels refelect regulatory responses. Moreover, debt financing weakens the incentive for regulators to "hold up" the firm so that leveraged firms can invest more than all-equity firms.
Schlagwörter: 
capital structure
regulation
investment
public utilities
bankruptcy
JEL: 
L51
G32
G38
L9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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