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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-13
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable Roommates, Stable Marriage, and College Admissions problems as special cases. This paper extends a result of the Stable Roommates problem to demonstrate that a class of homophilic preferences with an appealing psychological interpretation is sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this class of preferences are examined and further possible generalizations and directions for future research are discussed.
Schlagwörter: 
homophilic preferences
many-to-many matching
stability
stable fixtures problem
JEL: 
C78
D47
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