Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219276 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-28
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
How does salient public information affect voters' behavior? In a majoritarian voting game with common preferences, rational voters could use public information as an information device (depending on accuracy) or as a coordination device (regardless of accuracy). A simple lab experiment contradicts both hypotheses - subjects tend to follow public information when it is salient, regardless of the information's accuracy, but fail to use it as a source of coordination. In particular, it matters whether the information is recent - subjects are more likely to follow public information when it is provided closer to the voting decision. These findings are important because the salience of public information is easily manipulable by political actors.
Subjects: 
committee decision making
information aggregation
recency bias
voting experiment
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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