Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217735 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Government and Economics (EJGE) [ISSN:] 2254-7088 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Universidade da Coruña [Place:] A Coruña [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 5-24
Publisher: 
Universidade da Coruña, A Coruña
Abstract: 
This work provides an extension to an international context of the analysis made by Alfano, Baraldi and Cantabene (2013) on the role of political competition as a channel through which electoral systems affect corruption. Our result conflicts with that found by empirical literature on that topic that makes plurality rules the most virtuous in terms of corruption. Political scientists must be cautious in designing the degree of proportionality of electoral rules without take into account the variation in political competition that follows.
Subjects: 
Political competition
electoral systems
corruption.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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