Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217735 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Government and Economics (EJGE) [ISSN:] 2254-7088 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Universidade da Coruña [Place:] A Coruña [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 5-24
Verlag: 
Universidade da Coruña, A Coruña
Zusammenfassung: 
This work provides an extension to an international context of the analysis made by Alfano, Baraldi and Cantabene (2013) on the role of political competition as a channel through which electoral systems affect corruption. Our result conflicts with that found by empirical literature on that topic that makes plurality rules the most virtuous in terms of corruption. Political scientists must be cautious in designing the degree of proportionality of electoral rules without take into account the variation in political competition that follows.
Schlagwörter: 
Political competition
electoral systems
corruption.
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