Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217077
Authors: 
Heumann, Tibor
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 15 [Year:] 2020 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 319-359
Abstract: 
We study a principal--agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type, there is one of two possible outcomes: the type is allocated the efficient quantity or is left with zero rents ex post.
Subjects: 
Sequential screening
ex post participation constraint
information design
sequential information disclosure
dynamic mechanism design
JEL: 
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
107.24 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.