Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/215061
Authors: 
Bicchieri, Cristina
Dimant, Eugen
Sonderegger, Silvia
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 8059
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate whether individuals strategically distort their beliefs about dominant norms. Embedded in the context of lying, we systematically vary both the nature of elicited beliefs (descriptive about what others do, or normative about what others approve of) and whether subjects are aware of the forthcoming lying opportunity at the belief-formation stage. We build a dual-self model of belief distortion applied to the context of social norms and derive a number of precise predictions. Our findings provide a perspective on why, when and which norm-relevant beliefs are strategically distorted and show that not all belief distortions are created equal.
Subjects: 
lying
social norms
strategic beliefs
uncertainty
JEL: 
C72
C91
D80
D90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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