Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/214530
Authors: 
Portmann, Marco
Stadelmann, David
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CREMA Working Paper No. 2013-05
Abstract: 
We exploit a natural measure of congruence between politicians and their constituency' bnm bnnb fgvhjuis preferences to directly quantify the extent of legislative shirking and evaluate the mechanism of the median voter model. The median voter model explains the behavior of politicians with respect to revealed preferences of their constituency about 18.8 percentage points better than a random decision benchmark. However, it fails to account for a substantial part of its theoretical prediction of convergence. Nevertheless, competition for voters under majority rule crowds out individual charact eristics and party affiliations as potential factors which explain legislative shirking.
Subjects: 
Constituents' Preferences
Median Voter Model
Political Economy
JEL: 
D7
H7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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